A Research on Profit Allocation of the Wind and Other Powers’ Bundled Transmission

Herui Cui, Pengyu Zhang

Abstract


The lack of wind power’s assimilative capacity has become a bottleneck of wind power’s large-scale development in the future, while the bundled transmission model of wind power is highly recommended by many scholars at present. However, due to the distemperedness of China's current fiscal policy, the involved parties cannot get the corresponding policy incentives and the economic compensation for additional contributions, which restricted the implementation of the bundled transmission model. By discussing the basic theory of DEA Game, This paper built an excess profit allocation model based on DEA Game, and took an example to analyze the model’s feasibility. Thus, it provides some theoretical basis for the distribution amount and practice distribution forms of the excess profits, and proposes a solution to the problem of the bundled transmission model’s benefit distribution.

Keywords


DEA Game; wind power digestion; wind power transmission; profit apportionment

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DOI: http://doi.org/10.11591/ijeecs.v12.i9.pp6534-6543

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Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (IJEECS)
p-ISSN: 2502-4752, e-ISSN: 2502-4760
This journal is published by the Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science (IAES) in collaboration with Intelektual Pustaka Media Utama (IPMU).

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