Service Cooperation Incentive Mechanism in a Dual-channel Supply Chain under Service Differentiation
Abstract
An incentive mechanism about service effort provided by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain is studied under asymmetric information. The principal-anent models are developed for asymmetric information and symmetric information, and then the optimal fixed payment and the optimal profit sharing ratio are obtained. In contrast to the case under symmetric information, the conclusion implies that the manufacturer’s profit decreases under asymmetric information, the retailer’s profit keep same even lower service level is provided. Thus, the system performance of the supply chain decreases.
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Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (IJEECS)
p-ISSN: 2502-4752, e-ISSN: 2502-4760
This journal is published by the Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science (IAES) in collaboration with Intelektual Pustaka Media Utama (IPMU).