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Cryptanalysis on Privacy-Aware Two-Factor Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks

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Abstract

Das first proposed two-factor authentication combining the smart card and password to resolve the security problems of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). After that, various researchers studied two-factor authentication suitable for WSNs. In user authentication protocols based on the symmetric key approach, a number of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based authentication protocols have been proposed. To resolve the security and efficiency problems of ECC-based two-factor authentication protocols, Jiang et al. proposed a privacy-aware two-factor authentication protocol based on ECC for WSNs. However, this paper performs a vulnerability analysis on Jiang et al.'s authentication protocol and shows that it has security problems, such as a lack of mutual authentication, a risk of SID modification and DoS attacks, a lack of sensor anonymity, and weak ID anonymity.

Keywords*: Cryptanalysis, Vulnerability analysis, Wireless sensor networks*

1. Introduction

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) can be used to perform real-time monitoring in various environments. Networked sensors can easily be stationed in various environments (e.g., for forest detection and harmful gas monitoring) [1]. Generally, the gateway node has sufficient power and capacity, while the wireless sensors lack sufficient CPU power, memory, computational capability, and storage capacity. Therefore, generally, a user needs to connect with sensors directly to acquire the sensed data [2]. Considering the resources of sensors, the user authentication protocol for WSNs should be efficient in terms of computation cost. Therefore, the power consumption of the cryptographic algorithms used should be reduced while addressing the security requirements. To resolve the difficulty of designing a secure two-factor authentication protocol, a privacy-aware two-factor protocol that addressed various security problems with the resource sensors and sensed data was designed in [3].

In 2009, Das first applied two-factor authentication combining the password and smart card to solve the security problems of WSNs. It presented a new direction for user authentication for WSNs [4]. However, the authentication protocol Das proposed does not provide user anonymity, session key negotiation, or mutual authentication. In addition, it is vulnerable to several attacks, such as gateway node bypassing, offline password guessing, sensor node capture, and denial-of-service attacks. Thus, various improved authentication protocols for WSNs were proposed to resolve the various security problems [5-7]. In addition, in user authentication protocols based on the symmetric key approach, a number of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based authentication protocols have been proposed. Yeh *et al*. found that the protocol of Chen *et al*. does not provide a user password updating mechanism and is vulnerable to insider attacks. Thus, Yeh et al. proposed an ECC-based two-factor authentication protocol. However, in Yeh *et al*.'s scheme, the user and sensor cannot mutually authenticate each other [8]. To solve the problems of Yeh *et al*.'s scheme, Shi *et al*. proposed an improved ECC-based authentication protocol. Compared with the protocol of Yeh *et al*., the protocol of Shi *et al*. provides more diverse security features and performs better in terms of computation and communication [9]. However, in 2014, Choi *et al*. revealed that the authentication protocol of Shi *et al*. is vulnerable to unknown key share, stolen smart card, and sensor energy exhausting attacks. To eliminate these security weaknesses, they also proposed an enhanced authentication protocol [1]. Unfortunately, the protocol of Choi *et al*. still cannot achieve

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anonymity and untraceability. To solve the various security weaknesses of ECC-based two-factor authentication protocols, Jiang *et al*. proposed a privacy-aware two-factor authentication protocol based on ECC for WSNs. Jiang *et al*. claim their protocol achieves various security and usability features necessary for real-life application environments [2]. However, this paper analyzes Jiang *et al*.'s protocol and shows that it has security vulnerabilities, such as a lack of mutual authentication, a risk of SID modification and DoS attacks, a lack of sensor anonymity, and weak ID anonymity. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains Jiang *et al*.'s privacy-aware two-factor authentication protocol based on ECC for WSNs. Section 3 shows that Jiang *et al*.'s authentication protocol has the security vulnerabilities noted above. Section 4 concludes this paper.

2. Review of Jiang et al.' two-factor Authentication Protocol

Jiang *et al*.'s protocol is based on ECC for WSNs. It consists of four phases: registration, login, authentication, and password change. Table 1 shows the notations used in this paper [2]. The ECC provides better efficiency than Rivest Shamir and Adleman (RSA), because it can achieve the same security strength with a smaller key size. Specifically, the 160-bit ECC and the 1024-bit RSA have the same security strength [10, 11]. The elliptic curve equation is defined in the form: E_p (a,b) :$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ (*mod p*) over a prime finite field F_p , where , $b \in F_p$, and $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ (*mod p*).

Table 1. Notations

Notation	Description	Notation	Description
U_i	A user	*GWN*	A gateway node
S_j	Sensor node	SID_j	Sensor node identity
$H(\cdot)$	Hash function	ID_i	The identity of U_i
PW_i	The password of U_i	*TS*	The current timestamp
SK_{ij}	Shared session key	PTC_i	Protected temporal credential of U_i
DID_i, DID_{GWN}	A dynamic identity of U_i and *S*	TC_i , TC_j	Temporal credential of U_i and *S*
TE_i	The expiration time of a user's temporal credential	K_{GWN-U} , K_{GWN-S}	Master keys only known to *GWN*
||	The bitwise concatenation	$\oplus$	The bitwise exclusive OR

2.1. Registration Phase

Prior to starting Jiang *et al*.'s authentication protocol, *GWN* selects the finite cyclic additional group *G* generated by a point *P* with a large prime order *n* over a finite field F_p on an elliptic curve. Then, *GWN* randomly chooses a number *x* as its private key, computes the corresponding public key *y = xP*, and generates two master secret keys K_{GWN-U} and K_{GWN-S}. Then, *GWN* stores *x* and produces the system parameters {$E(F_p)$, *G, P, y*}. Figure 1 shows the user registration process. It is assumed that the communication channel between the participants is secure.

(R1-U) When a user U_i registers to *GWN*, U_i selects his/her own identity ID_i and password PW_i and randomly chooses a number r_i. Then, U_i calculates $HPW_i = H(PW_i \,||\, ID_i \,||\, r_i)$ and sends { ID_i , HPW_i } to *GWN*.

(R2-U) After receiving the request, *GWN* checks the legitimacy of ID_i and refuses the request if ID_i does not adapt to the requirement of user identity or is the same as an already registered identity in the verification table. Then, *GWN* computes $TC_i = H(K_{GWN-U} \,||\, ID_i \,||\, TE_i)$ and $PTC_i = TC_i \oplus HPW_i$. *GWN* stores (ID_i , TE_i) in the verification table. Finally, *GWN* publishes the card, which embraces { $H(\cdot)$, y , TE_i , PTC_i } to U_i.

(R3-U) U_i computes $HPW'_i = H(h(ID_i \,||\, PW_i \,||\, r_i) \bmod m)$, where *m* is $2^8 \le m \le 2^{16}$ integer, which determines the capacity of the pool of < ID_i , PW_i > pairs against offline password guessing attacks [12]. Then, U_i hoards r_i and HPW'_i into the card.

The sensor registration process is described as follows:

(R1-S) S_j presents its identity SID_j to *GWN* using a secure channel.

(R2-S) *GWN* computes $TC_j = H(K_{GWN-S} \,||\, SID_j)$ as the credential for S_j. Then, *GWN* replies to S_j with { TC_j }.

(R3-S) After receiving the response, S_j keeps *TC.*



Figure 1. Registration phase of Jiang *et al*.'s protocol

2.2. Login Phase

The following steps are performed in the system login phase.

(L1) When U_i wants to access S_j , U_i slots the smart card into a terminal and inputs ID_i , PW_i .

(L2) The smart card calculates $HPW'_i = H(h(ID_i \| PW_i \| r_i) \bmod m)$. If the comparison $HPW^*_i ? = HPW'_i$ is not the same, the card rejects the request. Otherwise, it continues to compute $TC_i = PTC_i \oplus H(PW_i \| ID_i \| r_i)$.

2.3. Authentication Phase

Subsequent to the login phase, the communicating agents (U_i , S_j , and *GWN*) mutually authenticate each other and establish a session key as follows. Figure 2 depicts these phases.

(A1) U_i selects a random number $a \in Z^*_{p-1}$ and calculates $A_i = aP$, $D_i = ay = axP$, $DID_i = ID_i \oplus H(A_i \| D_i)$, and $C_i = H(ID_i \| TS_1 \| D_i \| A_i \| TC_i)$, where TS_1 is the timestamp of the current computing platform. Finally, U_i forwards $\{ DID_i , A_i , TS_1 , C_i \}$ to *GWN*.

(A2) On receiving $\{ DID_i , A_i , TS_1 , C_i \}$, *GWN* verifies the freshness of TS_1. If TS_1 is not fresh, *GWN* refuses the request; otherwise, *GWN* calculates $D_i = xA = xaP$, $ID_i = DID_i \oplus H(A_i \| D_i)$, and $TC_i = H (K_{GWN-U} \| ID_i \| TE_i)$ and checks whether $H(ID_i \| TS_1 \| D_i \| A_i \| TC_i)$ is the same as C_i. If these two values are not the same, *GWN* refuses the request; otherwise, *GWN* chooses a sensor S_j and calculates $TC_j = H(K_{GWN-S} \| SID_j)$, $DID_{GWN} = ID_i \oplus H(DID_i \| TC_j \| TS_5)$, and $C_{GWN} = H(ID_i \| TC_j \| A_i \| TS_2)$, where TS_2 is the timestamp of the current computing platform. Finally, *GWN* sends $\{ TS_2 , DID_i , DID_{GWN} , C_{GWN} , A_i \}$ to the S_j .

(A3) On receiving $\{ TS_2 , DID_i , DID_{GWN} , C_{GWN} , A_i \}$, S_j checks the freshness of TS_2 . If TS_2 is invalid, S_j rejects the request; otherwise, S_j computes $ID_i = DID_{GWN} \oplus H(DID_i \| TC_j \| TS_2)$ and checks whether $H(ID_i \| TC_j \| A_i \| TS_2)$ and C_{GWN} are equal. If these two values are unequal, S_j terminates the current session; otherwise, S_j generates a random key $b \in Z^*_{P-1}$ and computes $B_j = bP$, $SK_{ij} = H(bA_i) = H(abP)$, and $C_j = H(TC_j \| ID_i \| SID_j \| B_j \| TS_3)$, where TS_3 is the current timestamp. S_j then sends $\{ SID_j , TS_3 , C_j , B_j \}$ to *GWN*.

(A4) After checking the legitimacy of TS_3, *GWN* checks whether $H(TC_j \| ID_i \| SID_j \| B_j \| TS_3)$ and C_j are the same. If these two values are not equal, *GWN* stops the current session; otherwise, *GWN* confirms that S_j is authenticated. Finally, *GWN* calculates $E_{GWN} = H(ID_i \| TC_i \| D_i \| B_j \| TS_4)$, where TS_4 is the timestamp of the current computing platform, and sends $\{ SID_j , TS_4 , B_j , E_{GWN} \}$ to U_i .

(A5) After checking the freshness of TS_4, U_i computes and checks whether $H(ID_i \| TC_i \| D_i \| B_j \| TS_4)$ and E_{GWN} are equal. If these two values are not the same, U_i stops the current session; otherwise, U_i confirms that S_j and *GWN* are authenticated. Finally, U_i computes the shared session key $SK_{ij} = H(aB_j) = H(abP)$.



Figure 2. Login and authentication phase of Jiang *et al*.'s protocol

2.4. Password Change Phase

(PC1) 1 If U_i wants to update his/her own password, he or she inputs his/her own card into a terminal and enters ID_i and PW_i .

(PC2) The smart card calculates $H(h(ID_i \| PW_i \| r_i) \bmod m)$. If the equations HPW^*_i ? = HPW'_i are not the same, the card refuses the request. Otherwise, U_i inputs the old PW_i , selects a new PW'_i , calculates $PTC'_i = TC_i \oplus RPW_i \oplus H(r \| PW'_i)$, and replaces PTC_i with PTC'_i.



Figure 3. Password change phase of Jiang *et al*.'s protocol

3. Cryptanalysis on Jiang et al.'s Two-Factor Authentication Protocol

This paper analyzes Jiang *et al*.'s authentication protocol and determines various security vulnerabilities, including a lack of mutual authentication, a risk of SID modulation and DoS attacks, a lack of sensor anonymity, and weak ID anonymity.

3.1. Lack of Mutual Authentication

Mutual authentication means that two or three parties authenticate each other. All of the parties (e.g., client/user, gateway, and sensors) are assured of the others' identity. The user and gateway authenticate each other using ID_i and TC_i, while the gateway and sensors authenticate each other using TC_j and C_{GWN}. However, mutual authentication between the user and sensors is not provided. The sensors can authenticate the user with the gateway's help. However, the user cannot authenticate the sensors. Thus, the user cannot verify whether the sensor SID_j is normal.

3.2. Risk of SID Modification Attacks

The user receives $\{SID_j, TS_2, B_j, E_{GWN}\}$ from *GWN* and checks the message's accuracy and freshness. However, there is no information indicating that SID_j in $\{SID_j, TS_2, B_j, E_{GWN}\}$ is now authenticated by *GWN*, so an attacker can perform a SID modification attack. When the attacker modifies the SID_j in $\{SID_j, TS_2, B_j, E_{GWN}\}$ to $SID_{attacker}$, the user is unaware of the change. Therefore, the user mistakenly believes that $SID_{attacker}$ is a normal sensor node and thus computes the session key SK_{ij} for secure communication with $SID_{attacker}$ even though the attacker cannot know the SK_{ij}. Moreover, when SID_j requests communication, the user cannot know whether SID_j is an authenticated sensor node, so they cannot communicate with each other.

3.3. Lack of Sensor Anonymity

Anonymity is a desirable security feature, and it provides identification and key agreement of the user and sensors during the login and authentication phases. Thus, Jiang *et al*.'s authentication protocol provides the user's dynamic identification DID_i to protect the user's anonymity. Moreover, this protocol uses DID_{GWN} to protect the gateway node's identification. However, Jiang *et al*.'s authentication protocol does not provide anonymity of the sensor node. Therefore, an attacker can know which sensor node is communicating with users. In addition, the attacker can abuse the sensor node's identification, because SID_j can be easily known by the attacker. Therefore, the anonymity of sensor nodes needs to be provided. First, S_j checks the freshness of TS_2. Then, if TS_2 is valid, S_j computes $ID_i = DID_{GWN} \oplus H(DID_i \,||\, TC_j \,||\, TS_2)$ and checks whether $H(ID_i \,||\, TC_j \,||\, A_i \,||\, TS_2)$ and the received C_{GWN} are equal.

3.4. DoS Attack

A DoS attack is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable so regular users cannot use the system's resources. Although the methods, motives, and targets of DoS attacks may vary, they generally involve efforts to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or suspend the services of a host connected to the Internet. In Jiang *et al*.'s authentication protocol, sensor nodes can verify the freshness of a message using TS_2. Therefore, when an attacker sends a previous message to the sensor node, the sensor node knows whether this message is a current message or a previous message. However, after an attacker gets the previous message $\{TS_2, DID_i, DID_{GWN}, C_{GWN}, A_i\}$, the attacker sends the message changing only TS_2 to the current timestamp. To check the legitimacy of the message, the sensor node needs to execute various computations, such as hash function (twice), verification function (twice), and timestamp checking (once). The sensor node has limited battery power and computational ability, so it is possible that a sensor node cannot perform its normal functions when an attacker executes a DoS attack on the sensor node.

3.5. Weak ID Anonymity

In Jiang *et al*.'s authentication protocol, the user can maintain the ID anonymity using DIDi. An attacker cannot compute ID_i from DID_i, because the attacker does not know $H(A_i \,||\, D_i)$ in $DID_i = ID_i \oplus H(A_i \,||\, D_i)$. However, ID_i can be exposed in the sensor nodes gained by the attacker. The sensor nodes are scattered in various places, so the attacker can find the sensor nodes and obtain their authority. Therefore, the attacker can compute the user's identity using

$ID_i = DID_{GWN} \oplus H(DID_i \| TC_j \| TS_2)$, because the sensor nodes know TC_j, which is shared in the sensor registration phase. Hence, the attacker can get ID_i after gaining the sensor nodes, and the anonymity of this protocol is not strong.

4. Conclusion

Jiang *et al*. proposed a privacy-aware two-factor authentication protocol using ECC for WSNs. They insist that their protocol achieves various security and usability features necessary for real-life application environments while maintaining acceptable efficiency. However, this paper analyzed Jiang *et al*.'s protocol and showed that this protocol has security vulnerabilities, such as a lack of mutual authentication, a risk of SID modification and DoS attacks, a lack of sensor anonymity, and weak ID anonymity. To solve these vulnerabilities, a security-enhanced privacy-aware two-factor authentication protocol using ECC for WSNs needs to be proposed.

Acknowledgements

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